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This article examines forces and events that have influenced the Palestinian political landscape 
over the past two decades, focusing, among other things, on the failure of the peace process and its 
effect on the changing relations among political elites and trends in the Palestinian occupied territories. 
While reflecting on the prospects for peacemaking between Israel and the Palestinians, from the start 
of the 1987 Intifada until the eruption of the second Intifada in 2000, this article will highlight factors 
that have contributed to the collapse of the Oslo Accords, the Camp David II Summit and the Road 
Map formula. The obstacles that have generally caused the failure of these peace plans include the 
continuation of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, the U.S.’s credibility problem in the 
region and the growing corruption attributed to the Palestinian Authority. 
 






As Palestinians and Israelis became engaged in bilateral and multilateral talks during the 
past two decades, they confronted several anticipated challenges that have halted their peace 
efforts. The unequal balance of power between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, the 
continuation of Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinian territories and the U.S.’s 
continued backing of Israel were, and remain, among the prime factors that have led to the 
collapse of almost all available peace plans intended to resolve the conflict. The escalation of 
violence between Israel and the Palestinians, during the second Intifada in 2000, essentially 
halted the peace process and intensified tensions between the incumbent and opposition 
elites within the Palestinian territories. The deterioration of Palestinian socioeconomic and 
living conditions during the Oslo process further enhanced the appeal of extremists among 
Palestinians. As the latest parliamentary elections revealed, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) 
continuous failure to meet and fulfill the basic needs and objectives of its people ultimately 
placed Islamists at the forefront of Palestinian politics. 
Israel’s disproportionate military offensive against the Palestinians, following the second 
Intifada, deepened Palestinians’ rage and frustration with the status quo. The willingness of 
Islamists and young nationalists to utilize extreme militant tactics during the second Intifada, 
as opposed to the first one, has largely been attributed to the failure of the Oslo peace process. 
The Palestinians’ realization that the Oslo process failed to pressure Israel into abandoning 
its control of the 1967 territories enticed many more to reject diplomacy in favor of militancy. 
Indifferent to their despair, Israel and the U.S. remained mostly concerned with satisfying 
Israel’s security claims than with addressing the basic needs of the Palestinians. The U.S.’s 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with the rising resentment to its power in the region, 
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further marginalized the Bush Administration’s insufficient involvement in existing efforts 
aimed at advancing the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. 
Since the PA’s creation in 1994, President Yasir Arafat had utilized its institutions, rules 
and procedures to strengthen his grip on power, either by silencing his critics or by 
channeling the public’s anger against Israel (Ghanem 2001: 104-135). The outbreak of the 
second Intifada, however, provided Islamists and militant nationalists with an excuse to 
pressure the PA’s leadership into responding to Palestinians’ public demands. Instead of 
negotiations, Islamists and young nationalists appeared determined to pressure Israel into 
abandoning the occupied territories, often through their emulation of Hizbullah’s suicide 
missions that were carried out during its offensive campaign against Israel’s military 
occupation of South Lebanon. After Arafat’s death and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as 
the PA’s new president, along with the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, 
the PA’s senior elite had hoped to revive the peace process. However, although the quartette 
members of the U.S., U.N., E.U. and Russia have collectively expressed their backing for the 
Road Map vision, President Bush’s pledge to support Israel’s annexation of large West Bank 
settlements has obstructed the pursuit of the Road Map plan, thus limiting the PA’s senior 
elite’s ability to remain in power (Bennet 2004: A1). Hamas’s success in the Palestinian 
Legislative Council’s (PLC) elections in 2006 was then used to justify the failure of the 
peace process and to provide Israel with a new mandate to implement Ariel Sharon’s 
“disengagement” plans without consulting the Palestinian leadership or assessing its effects 
on the residents of the occupied territories. 
Contrasting the effects of the first and the second Intifadas on the peace process reveals, 
among other things, that the eruption of the first Intifada facilitated new conditions for 
peacemaking to emerge between Israel and the Palestinians. A decade later, however, the 
failure of the Oslo process, which was anticipated mainly due to its content and procedures, 
significantly contributed to the outbreak of a second Intifada that subsequently created more 
changes in, and challenges to, the current landscape of Palestinian factional politics.  
 
 
2. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE THE TWO INTIFADAS  
 
Unlike the first uprising, the second Intifada of 2000 had notably strengthened the appeal 
of Islamist militants in the Palestinian territories. Whereas the Islamists’ rising influence 
during the first Intifada gave the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) senior elite in the 
diaspora a new opportunity to appear moderate and become engaged in peace talks with 
Israel, the weakening of the PA during the second Intifada gave Islamists a new chance to 
occupy a leading role in Palestinian politics. While the first Intifada created suitable 
conditions for the PLO to conduct talks with Israel, the second Intifada intensified the 
factional tensions among Palestinian elites in the occupied territories (Hanieh 2002). Despite 
Israel’s adoption of an iron-fist policy to crack down on the Palestinians during the first 
Intifada, Israel’s response to the type of violence launched during the second Intifada was far 
more severe and disproportionate (Elon 2002: 81-88). 
The long-term motives that led to the eruption and escalation of both Intifadas remains 
largely the same. Israel’s military occupation continues to represent the core root of 
Palestinians’ rage. Unlike the first Intifada, however, which exposed the way in which the 
Israeli soldiers were engaged in breaking the arms of Palestinian teenagers (Shiplers 1988: 6),
 
the media coverage of the second Intifada, notably in the U.S., depicted the Palestinians as 




victimizers rather than victims. Regardless of the socioeconomic, ideological and 
psychological factors that may explain reasons behind the Palestinian use of suicide 
bombings against Israeli civilians, it is doubtful that a real credible justification can be made. 
For their part, however, Palestinians who have either been oppressed and deprived of their 
land, or have experienced the deterioration of their social and economic conditions and have 
been humiliated daily by Israel’s military occupation policies often rationalize suicidal 
attacks as a means of seeking vengeance against Israel. Although they differ on strategies 
and goals, Palestinian militants and Lebanon’s Hizbullah fighters have both considered their 
use of suicide bombings as “legitimate” tactics for confronting Israel’s military superiority. 
Palestinian Islamists and young nationalists generally consider Hizbullah’s reliance on 
suicide bombings against Israel’s forces in Lebanon as a successful strategy that ought to be 
emulated by Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Although both Intifadas were aimed at emancipating the Palestinians from Israel’s 
military occupation, the second Intifada was influenced more by the failure of the Oslo and 
Camp David’s peace efforts (Baroud 2002: 19-22). The inability of the PA to serve its people 
also fueled Palestinians’ frustration with their leaders. The reshuffling of failed Palestinian 
governments during the Oslo process only exposed the depth of the PA’s dilemma in the 
territories. As such, the continuation of Israel’s military occupation coupled with the 
incompetence of the PA enticed an increasing number of young Palestinian militants to 
utilize the second Intifada as their only remaining means for pursuing Palestinian goals.  
In response to the 1987 Intifada, negotiations between the PLO and members of the 
Israeli Labor Party were secretly launched in 1992 and resulted in the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles in September 1993 and the launching of the Oslo process. 
Following the initial euphoria that followed the signing, the details of Oslo’s contents and 
procedures revealed new challenges that hindered the pursuit of peace (Shehadeh 2002: A23). 
For example, the Oslo formula failed to meet the minimal claims of the Palestinians, 
including: (1) the failure to bring about an Israeli military withdrawal and the removal of 
Jewish settlements from the 1967 territories; (2) the failure to create a geographically 
continuous and economically viable independent Palestinian entity over the 1967 territories, 
including Arab East Jerusalem; and (3) the failure to find a just solution for the Palestinian 
refugee problem (Guyatt 1998). Although the Oslo process failed to satisfy Israel’s security 
needs, its effect on the Palestinians was far more serious. The Oslo plan intended to offer the 
Palestinians no more than geographically isolated units encircled by checkpoints and 
highways to serve the 180,000 Jewish settlers residing in the West Bank and the 200,000 
Jewish residents of East Jerusalem (Hammami 2005: 102-114). Consequently, the Oslo 
process appears to have aimed at dividing the Palestinian territories into separate cantons that 
would have failed to end Israel’s interferences in Palestinian domestic and external affairs. 
Therefore, the Oslo’s process, contents and procedures have largely supported the evident 
inequalities that have always existed between the Israeli and the Palestinian negotiators 
involved in peace talks.  
Among the main immediate factors that caused the second Intifada’s eruption and led to 
its widespread was Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the al-Aqsa mosque, escorted by a 
thousand Israeli officers expressing sovereignty over the shrine (Greenberg 2000: A1). 
Initially, senior PA leaders had benefited from the Intifada’s outbreak, utilizing it as a means 
to press Israel into accepting their demands while providing the PA with an exit strategy after 
the failure of Camp David (Schulze 2001: 215-233). Although spontaneous, those who led 
the first Intifada also became the leading activists in the second Intifada. Unable to co-opt 
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the leaders of the second Intifada, the PA’s senior elite continued to defend the Oslo process 
by pointing to positive features that resulted in, among others, the return of 100,000 PLO 
affiliates from the diaspora to the Palestinian territories, the PA’s control over 18 percent of 
historic Palestine, along with other marginal or symbolic gains made during the early phases 
of the Oslo process. (Watson 2000: 237-251).  
Others, including the majority of the Palestinians, who opposed the Oslo plan, pointed 
more to the continuation of Israel’s military occupation of the territories, the lack of 
improvements in Palestinians’ living conditions and the expansion of Jewish settlements in 
the occupied territories. Israel also established additional roadblocks, checkpoints and bypass 
roads that linked Jewish settlements together and doubled the size of settlements from pre-
Oslo’s situation. Israel then erected a new separation wall that, along with isolating Israelis 
from Palestinians, divided Palestinian communities from each other (Hass 2003: 16). 
Although subsequent peace plans that followed the collapse of the Camp David II Summit, 
including the Road Map formula, have tried to re-engage the parties in peacemaking, such 
efforts failed. Given the failure of all official diplomatic routes, Palestinians and Israelis alike 
were urged to utilize non-official diplomatic tools as a means to establish confidence 
building with each other. Even though many on both sides have expressed interest in 
pursuing the path of “track-II diplomacy,” they remain unable to change the stalemate 
surrounding their current relations (Agha 2003: 167-196). 
 
 
3. THE PEACE PROCESS AND PALESTINIAN FACTIONALISM  
 
Since its inception in 1964, the PLO has managed to alternate its position between 
militant and diplomatic strategies. Given the failure of its popular militant strategy of the 
1960s and early 1970s, the PLO began, since 1974, shifting its position towards the use of 
diplomacy as a means to address its conflict with Israel. By entering into peace negotiations 
with Israel in the 1990s, the PLO expected the process to fulfill Palestinian basic political 
claims. With the failure of the Oslo process and the Camp David Summit, however, the 
senior leadership of the PA eventually lost much of its credibility and legitimacy in the 
Palestinian territories (Mohamad 2001: 46-76). For their part, however, Islamists succeeded 
in reviving support for militancy as a means to pressure Israel into withdrawing from their 
occupied territories. Hamas’s ability to capture, in the latest elections, 74 seats out of the 
PLC’s 132 seats serves as a prime example of the unintended results of Oslo’s apparent 
failure to satisfy basic Palestinian objectives. 
Although many within the PA’s senior elite benefited from their reliance on diplomacy in 
the early 1990s, the majority of the Palestinians, however, continued to suffer from 
widespread poverty, exclusion and despair during the entire course of the Oslo process (Hass 
2001: 9). In response, the PA’s senior elite often utilized their institutions to launch patriotic 
maneuvers to channel Palestinians’ public anger towards Israel (Samuels 2005: 60-91). 
Arafat also utilized the PA’s institutions to silence his opponents and remain in power, while 
at the same time, giving the impression of the presence of semi-democratic procedures in the 
Palestinian territories (Abu Toameh 2002: 3). Under Arafat, the PLC failed to ease the 
supremacy of the executive authority in Palestinian politics. Although the PA’s presidential 
and parliamentary elections were expected to institute the rule of law, accountability and 
transparency in the PA’s institutions, the continuation of Israel’s military occupation, the 




disunity among Palestinians, the U.S.’s alliance with Israel and the PA’s continued 
corruption, however, undermined the success of these procedures. 
The PA’s failure to carry out its anticipated duties contributed to the intensifying of 
factionalism among the Palestinian ranks along two generational divides: the young local 
elites and the senior PLO/PA’s leaders. Tensions between the two ranks reflected their 
differences on matters ranging from the fate of the peace process, the PA’s corruption and 
the use of militant and/or diplomatic tools to deal with Israel. Although most Palestinians 
have supported the PA’s negotiations with Israel in the period that preceded the Camp David 
II Summit, most Islamists and young nationalists, however, continued to express interest in 
waging violence against Israel. As time went by, the relationship between the PLO/PA’s 
incumbent senior elites continued to face an increasing challenge from the Islamist and 
young nationalist elites. These factional tensions, which surfaced after the eruption of the 
second Intifada differed considerably from the more easily managed relations experienced 
during the first Intifada between the PLO’s diaspora elites (the outsiders) and the local elites 
(the insiders) from the West Bank and Gaza. 
From the time of its restructuring and radicalization in 1968, the PLO’s main focus was 
centered on the plight of the Palestinian refugees in the diaspora. However, the local elites of 
the West Bank and Gaza were far more concerned with the future of their occupied territories. 
Despite their differences, local activists in the West Bank and Gaza began forming their own 
political groups, which, while resisting Israel’s military occupation, managed to provide 
allegiance to the PLO in the diaspora. The creation of the Palestine National Front (PNF) in 
1973 in the West Bank, for instance, served as a means by which local leaders in the 
occupied territories could rally behind the PLO. These organizations enhanced the PLO’s 
appeal at the expense of local Palestinian traditionalists and pro-Jordanian notables in the 
occupied territories (Ma’oz 1984).  
In much of the 1970s and 1980s, the most forceful opposition to Israel in the Palestinian 
territories came from student groups that were made up of nationalists, Marxists and 
Islamists. The activities carried out by these groups had improved relations between the PLO 
and the people of the occupied territories. Student activists also enhanced the popularity of 
the PLO, which indirectly pressured Israel into invading Lebanon in 1982, in order to wipe 
out the PLO as a step towards eliminating the local resistance to Israel’s occupation. The 
creation of the National Guidance Committee (NGC), formed by the local activists, also 
succeeded in channeling Palestinian efforts in support of the PLO.
 
Furthermore, the 
emergence of several other international, regional and local changes, including the collapse 
of the U.S.S.R. and the end of the Cold War era since 1989, the initiation of the first Gulf 
War in 1990-91 and the launching of the first Intifada in 1987, also created riper conditions 
for peacemaking efforts to emerge in the region. Along with these changes, the founding of 
the Unified National Leadership (UNL) in the Palestinian territories in 1988 enabled local 
leaders to exert more influence on the PLO to become responsive to the public needs of 
Palestinians. The first Intifada thus, succeeded in unifying Palestinians and in rescuing the 
PLO from an expected demise. To avoid a power struggle, similar to the one experienced 
currently, leaders of the first Intifada emphasized symbols of partnership with the PLO. To 
continue dominating Palestinian politics, the PLO persuaded the UNL in the territories to 
accept a more subservient role.  
During the second Intifada, however, local militants posed a serious defiance to the PA’s 
senior leaders (Shikaki 2002: 89-105). In response, the PA’s leadership continued to pressure 
its local opponents to accept an obedient role similar to that which they had accepted during 
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the first Intifada. Eventually, divisions among Palestinian elites broadened during the second 
Intifada along the same two generational divides. While the senior elites continued to 
forcefully support the peace process up until the Camp David Summit, Islamists and young 
nationalists rebelled further and adopted uncompromising positions towards Israel (Gerges 
2002: 25). Indeed, the success of Hamas in the PLC’s most current elections was, in part, 
caused by the organization’s challenge to the PA’s senior leaders. Consistent with its 
uncompromising stance on the peace process, Hamas initially advocated a strategy that 
called for eliminating the PA’s corruption and nepotism, along with escalating its militant 
confrontation with Israel. But in the end, Hamas was pressured into expressing a more 
conciliatory tone in order to ease existing outside pressures that had largely antagonized the 
already crippled socioeconomic conditions in the territories (Amirav 2006:6-9). 
Israel, on the other hand, under Sharon’s leadership, became aware that it can no longer 
maintain the Palestinians under its indefinite military rule. Ariel Sharon as well as Ehud 
Olmert both expressed interest in withdrawing from the populated centers of the West Bank 
as a step towards implementing the “disengagement” plan to secure the future of Israel as a 
Jewish state. The “disengagement” plan, which was adopted by Israel’s Kadema party 
leadership, also aimed at confining the Palestinians within manageable geographical limits, 
leading to the eventual establishment of a dependent Palestinian entity that lacks the 
resemblance of a genuine statehood. Indeed, Hamas’s success in the PLC’s elections 
accelerated Israel’s pursuit of the “disengagement” plan and other unilateral steps as a means 
to further isolate Palestinians and Israelis from each other.   
 
 
4. THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE POST-ARAFAT ERA  
 
The U.S.’s mediation attempts between Israel and the Palestinians, which have constantly 
favored Israel’s interests and downplayed Palestinian claims, is partly to blame for the failure 
of the Oslo formula and the Camp David peace plan. The pro-Israeli lobbyists, the neo-
conservative trends in the Bush Administration and the Protestant Evangelical groups have 
also played a significant role in defining the U.S.’s approach in ways that favor Israel at all 
costs. In their approach to foreign policy towards the region, U.S. officials have historically 
relied on already established frames of references that have supported Israel‘s interests at the 
expense of the Palestinians, namely in the post-1967 war era (Mersheimer & Walt 2006: 22; 
Anderson 2005: 102-129).  
Although new opportunities for advancing the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinians have surfaced following Arafat’s death, a real breakthrough remains unlikely to 
emerge, unless the essential claims of the Palestinians are addressed. These claims include, 
among others, recognition of Palestinians’ right to national self-determination over the post-
1967 territories, the removal of all Jewish settlements from these territories, the recognition 
of Arab East Jerusalem as their capital and finding a just solution to the problem of the 
refugees. To preserve Israel as a Jewish state, Sharon’s and Olmert’s governments continue 
to pursue unilateral policies of disengaging Israelis from Palestinians, often through the 
erection of a new wall that divides Palestinian families and communities from each other in 
the occupied territories (Leibowitz 2005: 59-62).  
For its part, the U.S.-sponsored Road Map vision suffers from problems similar to those 
that previously led to the collapse of the Oslo process and the Camp David Summit. The 
general content of the Road Map expects Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to determine the 




final fate of the 1967 Palestinian territories. This may entail the expectation of dividing these 
territories between Israel and the Palestinians. Israeli negotiators and U.S. mediators do 
indeed expect Palestinians to provide territorial concessions to satisfy Israel’s “demographic 
threats,” and other geopolitical concerns, along with providing compromises on the status of 
Jerusalem and on the future of the refugees. Based on past experiences in Palestinian-Israeli 
talks, notably during the Oslo process and the Camp David Summit, the Road Map formula 
is, therefore, destined to fail. Although in previous years Palestinian negotiators have never 
expressed a clear willingness to give up their internationally recognized claims, they were, at 
the Camp David talks, prepared to swap territories with Israel in order to address Israeli 
security and demographic concerns (Bennet 2002: A3). Given that most Palestinians believe 
they have already succumbed to Israel’s control over 78 percent of historic Palestine, they 
will continue to resent making more territorial concessions on the remaining 22 percent of 
historic Palestine. For most Arabs and Palestinians, the success or failure of the Road Map 
depends largely on the U.S.’s willingness and ability to pressure Israel into arranging for a 
total withdrawal from the 1967 territories, which, among other things, entails the removal of 
Israeli settlements. 
It was expected that Arafat’s death and the election of Abbas would serve, at least 
temporarily, to end Israeli and U.S.’s rhetoric concerning the lack of a Palestinian partner to 
negotiate. With Hamas’s control of the PA, however, Israel and the U.S. have raised the 
same arguments regarding the lack of a credible Palestinian peace partner. These claims have 
often been used as pretexts to redraw Israel’s boundaries and decide the final status issues, 
while accusing the Palestinian side of not being sufficiently cooperative in negotiations. 
Given that the quartette members placed most of the pressures on the Palestinian side to 
begin implementing the Road Map, it is unlikely that its vision for peace will succeed. 
The Road Map formula consists of three phases. In its first phase, the plan demands from 
the Palestinians the confiscation of weapons and the dismantling of the infrastructure of 
Palestinian militant factions. The completion of such a task is difficult to do unless the PA is 
given real assurances that a future political settlement would meet the basic demands of the 
Palestinians. Accomplishing this undertaking also entails the risk of creating a low -intensity 
level civil war that would hinder Palestinians’ stability, which has already occurred in Gaza 
since the election of Hamas’s new government. Furthermore, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza 
in 2005 had created a vacuum, which led, among other things, to the escalation of a power 
struggle between Hamas and Fatah. The restoration of stability in Gaza will depend on the 
ability of the Hamas-led government to negotiate seriously with Fatah in order to preserve its 
newly formed unity government that can alleviate, among other things, U.S. and Israeli 
challenges against it. 
Based on the degree of progress on the ground, the Road Map’s second phase requires 
Israel to recognize a provisional Palestinian state with provisional boundaries (Terje-Larsen 
2003: 88-89). The fear among Palestinians is that such a state may remain provisional. The 
third phase is the most controversial, since it focuses on determining final status issues such 
as statehood, refugees, settlements, security, borders and Jerusalem. The main concern that 
may arise at this phase is a repeat of the collapse of the Camp David II negotiations. At this 
point, however, the Road Map formula has largely become obsolete, given the facts on the 
ground have already determined much of the final status issues. Israel’s erection of a 
separation wall was one among many attempts made to define the content and scope of any 
future final status negotiations (Reese 2006: 20). Given these and other challenges to the 
Road Map plan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to test the U.S.’s credibility and 
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long-term interests in the region. The peace process could perhaps be advanced by enticing 
both parties to make use of steps that had already been prepared at Taba (Perssman 2003: 5-
43) as well as the Geneva talks following the eruption of the second Intifada (Meital 2006). 
Israel, backed by the Bush Administration, has, however, rejected both the Taba and Geneva 
talks in favor of Sharon’s unilateral “disengagement" plans.
 
For its part, the ability of Hamas 
to deliver for the Palestinians continues to depend on its willingness to moderate its strategy 
and formulate a stable, lasting and more unified government that would adhere to the same 
democratic rules and procedures that brought about Hamas’s electoral success in the PLC’s 
election. 
Consequently, the contents and procedures of existing peace plans and efforts to resolve 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, including the Oslo process, Camp David II and the Road Map 
formula, have, thus far, deprived Palestinians of much of their internationally recognized 
claims, while at the same time, assisting Israel in launching its “disengagement” plans. The 
absence of alternative peace models from the agendas of the parties involved in mediations 
have also threatened Palestinians’ unity on the one hand, and escalated the Palestinian 
conflict with Israel on the other. Although official diplomatic measures have thus far failed, 
the majority of the Palestinian and Israeli public continue at the same time to believe the 
conflict can only be resolved on the basis of either a two sovereign state setting or within a 
single, unitary and democratic state setting (Mohamad 2007: 99-122). In rhetoric, the U.S. 
and Israel continue to support the notion of the two states solution. In reality, however, their 
policies aim at confining the Palestinians in isolated territories within a new manageable 
setting. Although the widespread corruption in the Palestinian territories continues to 
obstruct local efforts for development along with hindering any meaningful political reforms, 
the main threat to Palestinian unity and to their future survival continues to be rooted in 
Israel’s military occupation of their territories. 
As far as the future of Palestinian politics is concerned, it is often argued that given the 
Palestinians’ historical experiences with autocratic Arab and Palestinian elites, along with 
their unrelenting suffering from Israel’s military occupation, the Palestinians may support the 
notion of democracy promotion far more than others in the region (Quandt 1994). On the 
other hand, it is perhaps more feasible to argue that the constant corruption in the PA’s 
institutions will eventually, like other Arab regimes, lead existing Palestinian elites to 
abandon democracy promotion in favor of authoritarianism as a more convenient route. As 
such, the internal dynamics of Palestinian politics, which are often ignored in favor of 





In conclusion, this study reveals the following main themes: (1) the second Intifada 
differed strategically, ideologically and in terms of its organizational base and outcomes 
from the first Intifada; (2) the second Intifada, along with its harmful consequences on both 
Israelis and Palestinians alike, was the result of flaws in the Oslo peace process and the 
Camp David II Summit, Palestinian rage with Israel’s polices as well as widespread 
frustrations with the Palestinian leadership; (3) although the majority of Israelis and 
Palestinians continue to favor a two-states solution for the conflict, an increasing number of 
Palestinians in the occupied territories are compelled to rely more on militancy as a means to 
resist Israel and manage local factional feuds between and among Palestinian elites; (4) the 




U.S.’s continued backing of Israel at all levels, which in part led to the failure of the peace 
process, encourages Palestinians to continually resort to the use of violence, rather than 
pursue negotiations; and (5) the fulfillment of Palestinians’ political aspirations in ending 
Israel’s military occupation of the territories remains a key factor to the success of any future 
peace effort and/or in the prospect of democratizing Palestinian politics. The existing facts 
on the ground, i.e., the continuation of Jewish settlement building on Palestinian land, point 
to, on the other hand, Israel’s unwillingness to accept a total withdrawal to the 1967 
boundaries. As such, the single factor that may compel Israel to abide to UN Resolutions 242 
and 338 is the U.S.’s insistence that Israel respects the rules of International Law and thus 
withdraws from the Palestinian territories. For its part, the PA must also be more willing and 
able to respond to Palestinian basic needs on the one hand, and to cooperate more effectively 
with the U.S. and Israel in order to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These 
steps might in the end make it possible to secure Palestinian basic goals without endangering 
Israel’s security concerns. While the search for, and perhaps achievement of, peace remains 
particularly difficult for both sides, it is not unthinkable that the violence of the second 
Intifada, the latest war in Lebanon and the continued challenges to the U.S. in Iraq may have 
created conditions for the emergence of Palestinian/Arab and Israeli cooperation towards 
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